

18 February 1983

N-arms pact odds slim, ex-CIA chief says

By BRIAN HOWARD
Star-Telegram Writer

The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union face internal pressures that will make a nuclear arms control agreement difficult, former CIA Director Stansfield Turner believes.

The United States, therefore, should concentrate on building "stabilizing" small, mobile missiles, he said here Thursday.

"I believe the odds are slim that under the present circumstances there will be a reduction of tensions," said Turner, CIA director under former President Jimmy Carter. "Hopefully, I'm wrong."

He also said the United States should scrap the MX missile system, build more cruise missiles and prepare for more trouble with European allies.

Turner, 59, made his remarks to about 150 people at Texas Christian University's annual Business Alumni Dinner at the Fort Worth Club and in an interview before the dinner.

Soviet President Yuri Andropov, who was Turner's counterpart in his previous capacity as leader of the Soviet KGB (secret police), will be "pushed and pulled" by competing internal forces as he tries to establish a power base, Turner said. Andropov faces the "deterioration" of his country's society, with problems such as alcoholism and corruption, as well as an economy that has been "gradually but steadily going downhill," he said.

Andropov will need to maintain the full support of his military — a Soviet segment traditionally not a leader in seeking compromise with the United States, he said.

For his part, President Reagan can't go further than his own right-wing backers will support, Turner said.

"While Mr. Andropov settles into office and Mr. Reagan has his own constraints, it's just not likely that the chemistry is going to be there" for an arms agreement, Turner said.

Barring a settlement, the United States should focus its efforts on the cruise missile rather than the MX missile system, said Turner, a Rhodes scholar and retired Navy admiral.

The MX contributes to the risk of nuclear war by accident or mistake because it is vulnerable to attack but also increases Soviet fears of a surprise U.S. attack, he said.

"That makes both of us sitting there with the finger on the trigger, nervous," he said, adding that MX deployment is part of a "war-fighting" orientation in the Reagan administration. "I don't think we happen to have to do that."

Cruise missiles are small and mobile and not easily detected by the Soviets, but they also are slow enough not to make the Soviets too nervous, he argued.

"Nuclear deterrence does work," he said. "Nuclear weapons do have some stabilizing qualities . . .

"We have an opportunity here to move to a nuclear policy that is stabilizing," he said. "Instead, we're moving toward a war-fighting doctrine."

Peace activists argue that cruise missiles should not be deployed in Europe, as planned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, precisely because their mobility and ability to fly beneath Soviet radar increase fear and instability.

File Only

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
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Mideast Intrigue

PLO Operative, Slain Reputedly by Israelis, Had Been Helping U.S.

Figure in Munich Massacre
Died in a 1979 Explosion;
Role in Diplomats' Safety

Arafat's American Channel?

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—On Jan. 22, 1979, an official of the Palestine Liberation Organization named Ali Hassan Salameh was killed in a car-bomb explosion in Beirut. One of the most notorious PLO terrorists during the early 1970s, he had helped plan the seizure of Israeli athletes at the 1972 summer Olympics in Munich. "We have lost a lion," said PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.

Mr. Salameh's corpse carried a hint that he was an unusual lion. In one of the dead man's pockets, according to a close friend, was a message sent that day from Bashir Gemayel—the leader of the Lebanese Phalangist militia and normally a ferocious enemy of the PLO—warning Mr. Salameh that his life was in danger.

Shortly after the assassination, Adm. Stansfield Turner, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, briefed President Carter on the incident. The CIA's information about who had killed Mr. Salameh (pronounced SAH-lah-may) wasn't conclusive, but senior Carter-administration officials say they suspected it was the Israelis. These officials say that despite Mr. Salameh's terrorist background, President Carter "expressed concern" at his death.

The reason for President Carter's dismay was that for over five years, Mr. Salameh, with Mr. Arafat's apparent approval, had been providing the CIA with intelligence that helped protect U.S. diplomats from extremist attacks by Palestinians and other Arabs. He had also helped implement an understanding with the U.S., reached in November 1973, that Mr. Arafat's PLO main-



Ali Hassan Salameh

stream group, Fatah, wouldn't harm Americans. Moreover, according to a top U.S. official, "the U.S. had reason to believe that the Israelis knew" that Mr. Salameh was secretly helping the U.S.

The Salameh connection, which amounted to a backdoor channel between the U.S. and the PLO, is one of the most intriguing tales to emerge from the conspiracy-laden Middle East. It illustrates the complex intelligence operations undertaken by the U.S., the PLO and the Israelis in this region. It also shows how, on occasion, U.S. and Israeli interests can differ sharply.

The implications of the Salameh story are especially delicate now, when Mr. Arafat is exploring new links to the U.S. through President Reagan's peace initiative, and when U.S. officials are publicly questioning whether Israel is obstructing American policy. But this article isn't based on any "official leak" by the U.S., Israel or any PLO or other Arab faction. This reporter first heard a bare outline of the Salameh story more than two years ago and has assembled the details in bits and pieces since then.

'Extraordinarily Helpful'

Hermann Ellits, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, says this of Mr. Salameh: "Over the years I was in government, I learned a good deal about his activities. I know that on a good many occasions, in a nonpublic fashion, he was extraordinarily helpful—as was Fatah—in assisting in security for American citizens and officials. I regard his assassination as a loss."

There probably won't ever be firm evidence about who killed Mr. Salameh, since he had enemies in the radical Arab camp as well as in Israel. But the consensus of senior Carter-administration officials familiar with the case is that the Israelis killed him largely in revenge for his earlier terrorist activities as a planner for the shadowy Black September group. These officials believe that Mr. Salameh's relationship with the U.S. wasn't an inhibition to the Israelis. In fact, severing this PLO link to the U.S. may have been "a political benefit (for the Israelis), in addition to a simple settling of scores," says a former top-level U.S. official.

Morton Dolinsky, the director of the Israeli government press office in Jerusalem, declines to discuss the circumstances of Mr. Salameh's death. An Israeli intelligence source asserts, however, that Mr. Salameh was killed by a team drawn from the Israeli army and the Israeli foreign-intelligence service, known as Mossad. This man explains: "Ali was a target because of his many operations against Israel and Jews in Europe."

Clarifying Complexities

The following account of Mr. Salameh's life and death is based on discussions with former U.S. officials, top PLO officials, several Israelis and some of Mr. Salameh's

participant in a stratagem by Mr. Salameh to develop closer ties with the U.S. A former top-level U.S. official explains that Mr. Salameh was "less an individual who was a source than a channel; he wasn't someone doing anything against his superior's wishes."

"Ali was a door to very strong relations with the Americans," says a member of the Fatah central committee. He confirms that Mr. Salameh sent a series of specific messages to the U.S., but he insists that "Ali was instructed in everything" by Mr. Arafat and other PLO leaders. "We played this role to get with the Americans," this PLO official says.

Mr. Salameh, known by the nickname Abu Hassan, was widely viewed in Beirut as Mr. Arafat's right-hand man. Only 37 years old when he died, he headed Mr. Arafat's Fatah security and intelligence unit, with up to 3,700 members and a monthly budget of \$1.5 million. The unit was known as Squad 17, apparently because Mr. Salameh's office was extension 17 on the PLO military telephone network.

He was a tall, handsome man, and even his close friends concede he was something of a playboy. He liked to drink whiskey, drawing an occasional reproach from Mr. Arafat, a devout Moslem. And he loved beautiful women, including the 1971 Miss Universe—a Lebanese-Christian woman named Georgina Rizk—who became his second wife.

Israeli intelligence officers who tracked him were struck by his European manner, and one still refers to him by the flamboyant code name Mossad gave him: "The red prince." By 1979, Mr. Salameh's daily habits made him an easy target. He traveled often between the houses of his first wife, a Palestinian woman from Haifa named Nashrawan Hassan Sharif, and his new bride, Georgina. He also made regular visits to his health club in the Beirut International Hotel for saunas and exercise.

Despite Mr. Salameh's charming qualities, he was unquestionably also a terrorist who had planned the deaths of many Israelis during the early 1970s. Indeed, according to one of his Arab friends, he planned the June 1973 murder of an Israeli military attache, Col. Yosef Alon, in Washington itself. Even a PLO official says he was disturbed by Mr. Salameh's terrorist role. "I thought Ali could do more away from this kind of work," he says.

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Washington Roundup

Hi, Spy!

Former CIA chief Stansfield Turner, asked his assessment of the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov—a former KGB boss—said in San Francisco, “I have to admit to you that we don’t have any sort of a fraternal order for chief spies.” He told the Commonwealth Club of California: “I’ve never met the man. I’d be cautious about believing that he’s a closet liberal.”

—Washington Staff

THE STANFORD DAILY (CA)
17 JANUARY 1983

Former CIA head speaks in Branner

By DAVID AZRIN

Senior staff writer

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner criticized a series of President Reagan's actions, which he said have "unleashed" the CIA, during a talk at Branner Hall Friday.

Turner called a 1981 Reagan executive order that for the first time authorized covert operations inside the United States a "bad move."

"It was bad from my point of view, because they opened up the possibility of the CIA spying on Americans. I don't think that it was desirable or necessary. They unleashed (the CIA) to an extent which I think was a bad move," he said before the audience of 120.

Turner, who headed the CIA for three years during the Carter administration, gave a brief talk and then answered a variety of questions from members of the audience.

Turner also said he was worried about a "gradual erosion" of checks on the CIA.

"The series of controls and oversight on the intelligence process has been weakened," he said.

"They (the CIA) need guidance. They need some form of checks. We have developed those. I really hope they (Reagan administration officials) don't weaken them further. I don't think they have weakened them seriously, but I am worried about a gradual erosion," he said.

Turner cited a number of administration actions in the past two years that have increased the power and secrecy of the CIA.

The executive order issued in late 1981 lifted a long-standing ban on covert operations inside the United States, permitting physical surveillance of U.S. residents when "significant foreign intelligence" was sought.

In addition, the Intelligence Identification Act enacted June 23 last year made it a crime to disclose names of U.S. intelligence agents, even when the information was publicly available.

According to Turner, Reagan may have also made the CIA less accountable to the National Security Council

than it was under previous administrations.

"The Reagan administration has weakened this check by not wording it quite as mandatorily, which signals to me at least an intent not to be as stringent," he said.

Turner also had criticism for U.S. military operations in Nicaragua, designed to curb the flow of arms shipments to El Salvador.

"I think it is a very ill-advised move that the government and the CIA are making. We have blown Central America out of proportion in my opinion," he said.

Turner said that when Congress appropriated money for El Salvador, Reagan was told that "none of this money is to be used to try to destabilize the Somoza regime."

"The administration is saying we are making these raids to prevent the Nicaraguans from supplying arms to the El Salvador rebels. It's a very fine and tenuous line. If they are down there with the intent of destabilizing, they are doing it against the law today," he said.

Turner also criticized Reagan's Soviet-American policies, by saying that improvements in relations between the countries are not possible in "this administration that talks so stridently against the Soviet Union."

"We must maintain a line of communication with the Soviet Union. If we ever get to where we really don't understand each other and we don't communicate at all, it could be dangerous for the whole world," he said.

In response to a question about CIA abuses of power, Turner said that although the CIA may have been guilty of such abuses in the past, it has always had "good motives."

"I believe that those excesses, those improper performances and intrusions into the life of Americans, were the excess of the dedication and the desire to serve the country," he said.

"The people in the CIA are not malevolent, but secrecy in any organization, in any society, breeds abuse," he said.

The talk was sponsored by the Stanford Law Forum and Branner Hall.

YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
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By Philip Taubman

William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, sat at the end of the mahogany conference table in his office. Outside, the late afternoon sun played across the trees that ring the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of documents, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr. Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which he had penciled several notes was positioned to his right.

"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of relevant experience and a good track record," Mr. Casey said, alluding to comments that he was unqualified for the job and had been appointed only because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had been fuming over the criticism for months, according to his friends, and now, in his first comprehensive interview since taking office, he wanted to set the record straight.

He flipped through the papers and extracted a yellowing clipping from The New York Times that extolled his record as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next, he provided several pages copied from a book about Allied intelligence operations during World War II; he had underlined a glowing assessment of his contribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The final clipping was a story that appeared in The Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director. The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."

It was an oddly defensive performance for a man who, according to classified budget figures provided by Government officials, is overseeing the biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelligence community since the early 1950's. Because intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely known that at a moment when the Reagan Administration is forcing most Government agencies to retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence organizations are enjoying boom times. Even the military services, which have been favored with substantial budget increases, lag well behind in terms of percentage growth, although military-run intelligence agencies are growing almost as quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelligence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden within the Defense Department's budget. With a budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 percent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18 percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is the fastest growing major agency in the Federal Government, according to Administration budget officials.

intentions, integrity
 and capabilities.

15 JANUARY 1983

STAT

Former CIA Chief Predicts Arms Control Talks Doomed

By H. G. Reza

Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said in San Francisco yesterday that the Soviet Union gained a "psychological advantage" in the arms control talks when President Reagan fired his two top negotiators.

Turner, speaking to the Commonwealth Club, criticized Reagan's Soviet policy and predicted that Wednesday's firing of arms negotiators Eugene Rostow and Richard Starr will lead to an increase in tensions between the two superpowers.

Rostow and Starr were seen as moderate forces in an administration that has consistently taken a tough anti-Soviet line. Turner said the ouster will result in a less flexible U.S. position on arms control and failure for the negotiations in Geneva.

Turner, who served as CIA director during the Carter administration, said the collapse of the talks would result in a greater U.S. military buildup accompanied by increasing economic problems.

He blamed the current icy relations between the United States and the Soviet Union on Republican "right-wing ideologues" who are influencing arms control policy.

Turner said it is difficult for

Russians Seek Trade Group Link

Geneva

After ignoring the agency for 38 years, the Soviet Union is seeking observer status with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Western officials said yesterday.

United Press

the intelligence community to know if calls for a mutual arms reduction from new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov are genuine or merely propaganda.

On the one hand, the Russians' internal problems with its economy and agricultural production would point to a willingness to want to avoid an expensive arms race. But Turner said that Andropov could also exploit the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations to solidify his hold in the Soviet Union.

"The Soviets have long-term problems with a disintegrating society. Therefore, it would be logical for them to want to ease tensions. But can he (Andropov) do that if he wanted to? He hasn't consolidated his power in the Soviet Union.

"It's also possible that he would want to develop tensions with the

United States and point to an American military threat to detract from the country's economic and societal problems," said Turner.

However, he added that the Reagan administration's inconsistent Soviet policy has confused American allies and the Russians, making it more difficult for both groups to understand what policy the United States is following.

"I have seen some confusing signals from the Reagan administration in the last two years," said Turner. "The rhetoric has been anti-Soviet, but the actions have not." The latter was in reference to Reagan's lifting of the grain and Soviet pipeline embargoes.

After his speech, Turner told reporters that these inconsistencies have given Andropov an edge in the recent propaganda battle over arms control.

"The American arms control team and strategy are in total disarray, giving Andropov a psychological disadvantage. He is getting a lot of good press and publicity for being forthcoming on controlling and reducing arms.

"Arms control is a complex issue. But on the surface Andropov scored a lot of points in Western Europe when immediately after assuming office he proposed a mutual arms reduction, which Reagan promptly turned down."